We initiate the provable related-key security treatment for models of practical Feistel ciphers. In detail, we consider Feistel networks with four whitening keys w i (k), i = 0, 1, 2, 3, and round functions of the form f (γ j (k) ⊕ X), where k is the master key, w i and γ j are efficient transformations, and f is a public ideal function or permutation accessible by the adversary. We investigate the key-schedule conditions that are sufficient for security against XOR-induced related-key attacks up to 2 n/2 adversarial queries. When the key schedules are non-linear, we prove security for four rounds. When only affine key schedules are used, we prove security for six rounds. These also imply secure tweakable Feistel ciphers in the Random Oracle model. By shuffling the key schedules, our model unifies both the DES-like structure (known as Feistel-2 scheme in the cryptanalytic community, also known as key-alternating Feistel due to Lampe and Seurin) and the Lucifer-like model (previously analyzed by Guo and Lin). This allows us to derive concrete implications on these two (more common) models and helps understanding their related-key security difference.
I. INTRODUCTION
F EISTEL-LIKE blockciphers consist of several iterative applications of a simple Feistel permutation
for a keyed function G : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n on n-bit strings, yielding a 2n-bit blockcipher [1] . Such ciphers and their generalizations constitute a half proportion of modern blockciphers, including some most popular designs such as DES [2] , Lucifer [3] , GOST [4] , and NSA's SIMON family [5] . This has made it the object of a very large (and still increasing) amount of analyses.
In information-theoretic model, the round-function G would be assumed somewhat random. Without additional hardness assumption, provable security is limited to at most 2 n queries [6] , which is much smaller than 2 2n , the domain-size of the Feistel ciphers. Despite this limitation as well as the gap between the strong assumption on G and the weak roundfunctions in practical ciphers, this approach excludes any possibility of generic attacks and supplies insights into the cipher structures. Therefore, it has found applications in both round-function, i.e. the state at round i is updated according to
This afterwards manner effectively eliminates the key interruption in the 1st round and in the last round and allows the analyst to analyze an equivalent two-round-reduced variant [44] , using the original 1st and last round-keys as whitening keys: 0k 1 for pre-whitening, and k t 0 for post-whitening (we include a formal clarification in Appendix A). We denote by KAFv the resulted whitening key-based KAF Variant. Roughly, KAFv or the Lucifer-like model and their multi-line generalizations capture Blowfish [45] , TEA [46] , XTEA [47] , SIMON [5] , Piccolo (multi-line KAFv) [48] , and RC2 [49] . Most importantly to us, each KAFv instance is also captured by a KAFw instance with a corresponding key-schedule (a formal analysis is given in section V-B). Therefore, our model KAFw seems the most general. By the above discussion, it seems the three models KAFw, KAF, and KAFv are cryptographically equivalent modulo different key-schedules. But this contradicts existing understandings. For example, it was commented that the Lucifer-like structure blocks the complementation property, while in KAF the first and last rounds are more effective [44] ; and that KAFv seems stronger against RKAs, which appears one of the motivations to use it [37] . And, assuming independent random round-functions and identical round-keys, the 21-round KAFv variant is indifferentiable from ideal ciphers [50] , while the KAF variant is never indifferentiable [38] (even worse, such KAF would collapse to a 1-round KAC built on a keyless multi-round Feistel permutation! see page 5265). As will be unveiled in this paper, this distinction stems from the fact that to achieve the same level of security, KAF and KAFv models require different properties from the involved key-schedules; and with common key-schedule designs, KAFv has a higher chance of being secure against RKAs than KAF ! (For details please see below.) Our Contributions. We first focus on the KAFw f,(w,γ ) model and prove general results, and then derive concrete implications on the more popular KAF and KAFv models.
In detail, we analyze both the case of (w, γ ) being (highly) non-linear (with respect to ⊕) and the case of (w, γ ) being purely affine. In each case, (as mentioned) KAFw f, (w,γ ) uses identical round-functions and sub-keys derived from an n-bit master-key. For the round-function f , we consider both f = F a random n-to-n-bit function (denoted KAFw F, (w,γ ) ) and f = P a random n-bit permutation (denoted KAFw P,(w,γ )distinguished by the superscript). The consideration here is two-fold. First, both choices have been adopted in practice, e.g. GOST uses a 32-bit permutation, while SIMON2n/κ uses an n-to-n-bit non-bijective function. Second, both choices have advantages: random functions are theoretically attractive since they have less structural properties than random permutations, while the latter allow practical instantiations using e.g. SHA-3 permutations [51] (will be discussed later). In all, we analyzed four cases: KAFw F, (w,γ ) and KAFw P,(w,γ ) with non-linear (w, γ ), and KAFw F, (w,γ ) and KAFw P, (w,γ ) with affine (w, γ ). With non-linear (w, γ ), our main result states sufficient conditions on the key-schedule so that the 4-round KAFw F, (w,γ ) and KAFw P, (w,γ ) ciphers are secure against ⊕-RKAs up to O(2 n/2 ) queries, where the O(·) notation hides factors that depend on (w, γ ). Such good key-schedules can be instantiated via field arithmetics. For example, with the following key-schedule, the 4-round KAFw F, (w,γ ) and KAFw P, (w,γ ) are secure up to c·2 n/2 queries for a small constant c (which is given in section VI):
• w 0 (k) = w 3 (k) = γ 2 (k) = γ 3 (k) = 0; • w 1 (k) ⊕ γ 1 (k) = M 1 ⊗ k ⊕ k 3 , and w 2 (k) ⊕ γ 4 (k) = M 4 ⊗k ⊕k 3 , where M 1 = M 4 are two non-zero constants chosen from {0, 1} n , and ⊗ denotes multiplications taken over the finite field F 2 n .
Interestingly, this means one could set γ 1 (k) = γ 4 (k) = 0, i.e., the security of the 4-round Feistel cipher can be fully based on carefully chosen pre-and post-whitening keys. For any cipher with an n-bit master-key, an RKA adversary could leverage collisions between secret related-keys and offline guesses for distinguishing with 2 n/2 queries [18] . Our birthday bound is thus tight. The 4 rounds are also tight, as otherwise a standard (i.e., non related-key), adaptive chosen-plaintext and ciphertext attack (CCA) is possible (see [6] ).
Without non-linearity, using a related-key boomerang [25] distinguisher we break four rounds with any affine (w, γ ), and further using the boomerang switch trick [24] we break five rounds under one more assumption on (w, γ ). Our positive result states conditions on the key-schedule that suffice for 2 n/2 security of 6-round KAFw F, (w,γ ) and KAFw P, (w,γ ) . The (simple) conditions (roughly) prevent self-symmetry and complementation properties. An example, which also highlights the importance of the 1st and last round-keys, is as follows:
• w 0 (k) = w 1 (k) = w 2 (k) = w 3 (k) = 0, i.e., no whitening keys; • (γ 1 (k), γ 2 (k), γ 3 (k), γ 4 (k), γ 5 (k), γ 6 (k)) = (k, 0, 0, 0, 0, π(k)), where π(k L k R ) = k R k L ⊕ k R . Note that this π is a linear orthomorphism, i.e., a permutation of {0, 1} n for which x → x ⊕ π(x) is also a permutation. Orthomorphisms have been found helpful in establishing nice theoretical results, in particular minimal Luby-Rackoff models [52] and 2-round KACs [53] . We remark that such a key-schedule seems rather weak. Yet, it suffices for our birthday provable security. Stronger key-schedules might help establish beyond-birthday security, which is left for future work.
IMPLICATIONS ON KAF AND KAFv. From the general results on KAFw we can derive positive results on 4-and 6round KAF and KAFv, and that which conditions on the key-schedules suffice for security.
For non-linear key derivation functions (KDFs) our results indicate they could increase the ⊕-RKA security of KAF. This confirms the theoretical soundness of designs with highly non-linear key-schedules, e.g. CAST-128 [54] . 5 For affine KDFs the situation is a bit complicated (and more interesting). Roughly speaking, for KAF (and also KAFw) ciphers, one should pay additional attention on the interaction between the KDFs at the odd rounds and even rounds respectively. On the other hand, for KAFv ciphers it (may) suffice to just focus on designing each round-KDF, without considering the interactions between different rounds. These explain the different behaviors of KAF and KAFv structures, and serve as theoretical evidence that with common ad hoc key-schedule designs, KAFv variants do have a higher chance to achieve ⊕-RKA security than KAF and KAFw. This confirms the theoretical soundness of reverting to KAFv structures to improve RKA security, which-as mentioned,-seems a folklore [37] , [44] , and seems the idea underlying many KAFv ciphers mentioned before. For clearness, more discussion is deferred to Section V, after we present the concrete key-schedule conditions. Aside from clarifying KAF and KAFv models, our results also provide new insights into designing affine key-schedules for practical Feistel ciphers, which is a long-standing open problem hightlighted in e.g. [12] and [23] . Note that affine key-schedules are usually preferred (e.g., DES, SIMON, etc.) due to their efficiency and compatibility with frequently rekeying. TWEAKABLE FEISTEL CIPHERS. By the general result of Bellare and Kohno [18] , given a ⊕-RKA secure blockcipher E k (M) with n-bit k, XORing the tweak t into the key, i.e. E k⊕t (M), gives rise to a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) with nbit tweaks and keys and provable security against 2 n/2 queries. Therefore, efficient tweakable Feistel ciphers with birthday security could be obtained from our results. We stress that tweakable Feistel ciphers obtained via our approach are in the Random Oracle Model, i.e. with public random roundfunctions, which significantly deviates from the tweakable Luby-Rackoff ciphers [56] built upon secret random functions.
MODES FOR PERMUTATIONS. Alternatively, the variants
KAFw P,(w,γ ) , KAF P,γ , and KAFv P,γ * can be viewed as modes for cryptographic permutations. With the appearance of reliable permutations such as the permutations underlying SHA-3 [51] and the Simpira family [57] , our results allow creating highly modular wide-block ciphers with some level of provable ⊕-RKA security support, or wide-block tweakable Feistel ciphers. These may find application in various settings, for example, instantiating provably secure robust authenticated encryption [57] , [60] , Onion-AE [58] , and disk encryption [59] .
For comparison, the KAC results [21] , [29] , [30] , [61] also offered such permutation modes. But KAFw P, (w,γ ) achieves domain extension at the same time, i.e. it offers a provable TBC from "smaller" permutations. This may reduce implementation cost and increase security confidence.
Finally, we remind the reader that all of our results are derived in the Random Oracle Model. Once instantiated, arguments and security insurance turn heuristic [63] .
Related Work and Comparison. As mentioned, Barbosa and Farshim (BF) have studied provable RKA-security of Luby-Rackoff models [10] . Here we make a comprehensive comparison. In detail, BF proved the following 4-round Luby-Rackoff variant (see Eq. (1) for the function G k i (X))
is CCA secure against RKAs, if G is an RKA-secure PRF. BF's work has two advantages:
(i) Their results covered a much wider range of Related-Key Derivation (RKD) function set. Informally, this means LR k 1 ,k 2 is secure even if the attacker queries LR ψ(k 1 ,k 2 ) for ψ more complicated than (k 1 k 2 ) ⊕ . (ii) Their round-functions are more "generic", and could be instantiated under complexity assumptions. For (i), as we argued, we aim at bridging theory and reality. The most widely-used attack model is ⊕-RKA, and it's not clear whether the complicated RKD functions are indeed possible in reality. Moreover, for KAFw, RKA security against larger RKD sets isn't "for-free": since the sufficient key-schedule conditions heavily depend on the concrete RKD function (e.g. see Definition 1), more complicated key-schedules are likely required. Random oracle KDFs should be sufficient for all "interesting" RKD sets, but they fall short of providing insights into practical designs. In all, it seems questionable to spend a lot of complexity on the key-schedules to buy security against somewhat artificial RKD sets. These clarify why we concentrate on ⊕-RKAs. Still, considering larger RKD sets is of theoretical interest, and is a possible future direction.
For (ii), we argue switching from Luby-Rackoff to KAFw is a significant step in cryptography along two axes.
First, viewing Feistel networks as abstract models of real-world blockciphers, we already argued that the Luby-Rackoff model LR k 1 ,k 2 (M), though seems generic, is arguably too far from cryptographic reality in the RKA setting. Even in theory there remains imperfectness: the Luby-Rackoff model doesn't show how to concretely design keyed primitives from (conceptually) simpler keyless primitives; it just "defers" the task to designing keyed round-function G k i . In the RKA setting, this requires an RKA-secure PRF G k i from keyless primitives, which is even harder.
In contrast, KAFw results demonstrate how to construct blockciphers from keyless permutations or functions, which fitted into a hot topic (see the KAC papers [12] ), and has been recently re-emphasized by Diffie (in Leiden, March, 2018). This nicely fills in the gap left by Luby-Rackoff results.
Second, viewing Feistel networks as modes, this represents switching from modes for PRFs/blockciphers to modes for keyless permutations. Permutation-based modes not only offer more choices, but also reduce the burden of designers (they could focus on designing one permutation without considering RKA issues). Therefore, it has been a long trend, with prominent examples include the popular multi-purpose sponge functions [65] , permutation-based hash functions [67] , [68] , and authenticated encryption modes [64] , [66] .
In summary, BF's work is more foundational, and shows how to build RKA secure PRPs from RKA secure PRFs, while our work tries to shed more light on the practical side. BF's Luby-Rackoff approach also gives rise to RKA-secure ciphers and TBCs, but it requires an RKA secure PRF, for which it may not be easy to find an efficient and reliable candidate (especially when a large block-size is desired).
A concurrent work of Cogliati et al. [62] shows how to construct wide-block TBC from SPNs. They focus on (better) beyond-birthday bounds, while we proved ⊕-RKA security which may not be implied by tweakable pseudorandomness. They shed lights on SPNs, while we on Feistel (that could use non-invertible functions). In all, the two works are complementary.
Concentrating on Feistel ciphers in the ideal model, previous works only considered KAF and KAFv. In the provable setting, KAF has been analyzed by Lampe and Seurin [9] . While they proved better bounds of 2 tn t+1 queries for 6t rounds, they assumed completely independent round-functions and independent round-keys and they only considered the single-key security. A recent improvement considered correlated round-keys, and proved multi-user security with birthday bounds 2 n/2 at 4 rounds and beyond-birthday bounds 2 2n/3 at 6 rounds [69] . The 4-round "minimal" KAF scheme given in [69] consumes a (linear) orthomorphism for the keyschedule, which is very similar to ours. Thus in some sense, our results indicate that stronger key-schedule assumptions (i.e., non-linearity) buy ⊕-RKA security. We additionally considered round permutation case, and this gives rise to permutation-modes. Another (mentioned) work is the indifferentiability of KAFv of [38] , the security bound of which was however too weak.
Initiated in [70] , a series of papers established efficient generic approaches to obtain RKA secure blockciphers from PRPs [10] , [71] , which are complementary to our "concrete" results. Generic transformations however fall short of deepening the understanding of widely-deployed structures.
Finally, in the ideal model, key-schedule conditions that suffice for some level of security have been characterized for single-key security of Luby-Rackoff [72] , KACs [53] , and SPNs [62] , for ⊕-RKA security of KACs [21] , and for indifferentiability of Luby-Rackoff [11] and KACs, see [15] and the reference therein. These results are complementary to ours. Since we identified concrete conditions, our work is closer to the series [21] , [53] , [62] .
Possible Future Works include: investigating RKA security of KAFw with respect to larger RKD function sets, posing beyond-birthday secure tweakable KAFw variants, or studying key-schedules sufficient for chosen-key security [73] . The most attractive direction seems to prove beyond-birthday security for KAFw models with ≥ 2n-bit master-keys. This is much closer to reality, but it requires modeling the combinatorial properties of "non-trivial" key-schedules for longer masterkeys, which seems quite hard. For RKA security, some level of dependence has to be assumed between the round-keys [12] . The dependence should be both close to reality and enough for proofs. So which type of dependence is satisfying? A natural idea is to consider an alternating form of round-keys γ 1 (k), γ 2 (k ), γ 3 (k), γ 4 (k ), . . ., where k and k are the two halves of a 2n-bit master-key. But this model seems too artificial.
Organization. Section II presents notations, definitions, and tools. In Sections III and IV, we analyze the ⊕-RKA security of KAFw f,(w,γ ) with non-linear and affine (w, γ ) respectively. Then, from the KAFw results we derive results on KAF and KAFv in Section V, and make discussion on theoretically best possible results in Section VI. The complementing attacks are given in Appendix B to help understanding our proofs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
General Notation. For integers 1 ≤ b ≤ a, we write (a) b = a(a − 1) . . . (a − b + 1) and (a) 0 = 1 by convention. In all the following, we fix an integer n ≥ 1 and denote N = 2 n . Further denote by F (n) the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , by P(n) the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n , and by BC(n, 2n) the set of all blockciphers with 2n-bit block size and n-bit keys. For a finite set X , X $ ← − X means that an element X is selected from X uniformly at random. For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} n , XY or simply XY denotes their concatenation. Finally, throughout this paper, we denote k ⊕ by k for simplicity. Non-linear and Affine Functions. For a function γ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , its non-linearity could be measured by
Viewing the n-bit input k as an n-dimensional vector over F 2 , an n-bit affine function γ can be defined as
for a fixed n × n matrix over F 2 and a fixed n-dimensional vector C over F 2 . By these, a t-round affine key-schedule (w, γ ) = ((w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ), (γ 1 , . . . , γ t )) (as mentioned in the Introduction) would be specified by t + 4 fixed matri-
and
We stress that the multiplication M · k should be distinguished from the aforementioned field multiplication M ⊗ k. Uniform AXU Functions. For conciseness, we characterize good non-linear key-schedules using standard notions of almost XOR-universality (AXU) and uniformity for keyed (hash) functions. To this end, we serve their definitions below. First, a keyed function H k (·) from the domain X to {0, 1} n is said to be δ-uniform, if for any x ∈ X and y ∈ {0, 1} n ,
KAFw Ciphers. As mentioned in the Introduction, we focus on KAFw f,(w,γ ) , the KAFw variants with two features: (i) the same function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is used at each round, and (ii) the key-schedule is (w, γ ) = ((w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ), (γ 1 , . . . , γ t )), i.e. the i -th whitening key wk i is derived from the n-bit master-key k via wk i = w i (k), and the i -th round-key k i is k i = γ i (k). For such variants, the i -th round transformation is defined as
where W L and W R are respectively the left and right n-bit halves of the input. Then the t-round KAFw f,(w,γ ) variant is defined as (cf. Fig. 1 )
To make it more precise, we give formal descriptions for the 4-and 6-round KAFw f,(w,γ ) that will be studied later. For the 4-round KAFw
, on the 2n-bit input W which is parsed into LR, the computation proceeds in 4 steps:
. One could see Fig. 1 (left) for illustration. For the 6-round KAFw f,(w,γ ) k , on input W = LR, the computation proceeds in 6 steps (as in Fig. 1 (right) ):
As noted in [74] , a KAFw cipher (even with independent round-functions) with an even number of rounds can be seen as a special case of a KAC. In detail, the i -th and (i + 1)-th rounds with round-functions f i and f i+1 and round-keys k i and k i+1 can be rewritten as
However, provable results on KAFw cannot be derived by black-box composition of existing results on KACs and keyless Feistel, since no provable results can be seen on
0 is a keyless permutation. This is known to be insecure against RKAs [21] .
⊕-RKA Security. We follow Cogliati and Seurin [21] to formalize ⊕-RKA security in the ideal model. In detail, let E be a (n, 2n)-blockcipher, and fix a key k ∈ {0, 1} n . We define the ⊕-restricted related-key oracle RK[E k ], which takes as input an "offset" ∈ {0, 1} n and a plaintext L R ∈ {0, 1} 2n , and returns
Then, we consider a ⊕-restricted related-key adversary D which has access to a function oracle f and a related-key oracle, and must distinguish between two worlds as follows:
where IC is an ideal cipher independent from f , and k is randomly drawn. The distinguisher is adaptive, and can make two-sided queries to the related-key oracle. Note that in the ideal world, the oracle RK[IC k ] essentially implements an independent random permutation for each offset ∈ {0, 1} n . Formally, when f = F is a random function, D's distinguishing advantage on KAFw F,(w,γ ) is defined as
where the former probability is taken over the random draw of IC
, and the latter probability is taken over k
Here the superscripts help distinguish between random function-and permutation-based KAFw.
Furthermore, we consider computationally unbounded distinguishers, and we assume without loss of generality (wlog) that the distinguisher is deterministic and never makes redundant queries. For non-negative integers q e , q f , we define the insecurity of the KAFw f,(w,γ ) cipher against ⊕-restricted related-key attacks as
where the maximum is taken over all distinguishers D making exactly q f queries to the function oracle and in total q e queries to the related-key oracle (termed as (q f , q e )-distinguishers).
The H-Coefficients Technique. We employ the H-coefficient technique [75] , and follow the paradigm of Chen and Steinberger [13] . To this end, we summarize the information gathered by the distinguisher in tuples Q E and Q f . The tuple
summarizes the queries to the related-key oracle, and means that the j -th query was either a forward query ( j , L j R j ) with answer S j T j , or a backward query ( j , S j T j ) with answer L j R j . Throughout the remaining, we'll use the bold letter t as a simplified notation for a tuple (,
Similarly to Q E , the tuple
summarizes the queries to the round-function f , and • when f = P is an invertible permutation, it means the j -th query was either a forward query x j with answer y j or a backward query y j with answer x j ; • when f = F is a non-invertible function, it means F was queried on x 1 , . . . , x q f and answered y 1 , . . . , y q f correspondingly. To simplify the arguments (in particular, the definition of "bad transcripts"), we reveal to the distinguisher the key k at the end of the interaction. This is wlog since D is free to ignore this additional information to compute its output bit. Formally, we append k to (Q E , Q f ) and obtain what we call the transcript τ = (Q E , Q f , k) of the attack. With respect to some fixed distinguisher D, a transcript τ is said attainable if there exists oracles (IC, f ) such that the interaction of D with the ideal world (RK[IC k ], f ) yields τ . We denote T the set of attainable transcripts. In all the following, we denote T re , resp. T id , the probability distribution of the transcript τ induced by the real world, resp. the ideal world (note that these two probability distributions depend on the distinguisher). By extension, we use the same notation for a random variable distributed according to each distribution. And we define
Given a tuple Q f of function queries and a function f , we say that f extends
Similarly, given a related-key oracle transcript Q E , a blockcipher E, and a key k ∈ {0, 1} n , we say the related-key oracle
With all the above definitions, the main lemma of H-coefficients technique is as follows.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 in [53])
Fix a distinguisher D. Let T = T good ∪ T bad be a partition of the set of attainable transcripts T . Assume that there exists ε 1 such that for any τ ∈ T good , one has
and that there exists
A proof could be found in [53] . Finally, it's not hard to see
III. KAFw WITH NON-LINEAR KEY-SCHEDULES
It is well-known that 3-round Feistel networks are not CCA secure even in the single-key setting. So we consider 4-round KAFw. First, in section III-A, we present key-schedule conditions that are sufficient for the ⊕-RKA security of the 4-round KAFw P,(w,γ ) (which also turn out sufficient for 4-round KAFw F,(w,γ ) ). Then, we start from KAFw P,(w,γ ) , analyze it in section III-B, and then discuss how to adapt the proof for the 4-round KAFw F,(w,γ ) variant (by "dropping" some modules from the proof for KAFw P,(w,γ ) ) in section III-C.
A. Conditions on the Key-Schedules
4-round key-schedules defined as follows would suffice.
Definition 1 (Good Key-Schedule for 4 Rounds) Consider a 4-round key-schedule
satisfy two conditions as follows:
An example of good key-schedules with δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ≤ 3/N was exhibited in the Introduction, cf. Our Contributions.
Note that ϕ 1 (k) and ϕ 4 (k) effectively mask (and protect) the inputs to the 1st and last round-functions respectively. This protection would be ineffective if the δ 1 -uniformness is seriously compromised. An extreme example is ϕ 1 (k) = 0, for which an adversary could freely compute the 2nd-round intermediate value as RL ⊕ F(R).
Further note that, ϕ i (k ⊕ ) is δ 2 -AXU essentially means the non-linearity (see Eq. (4)) of ϕ i is δ 2 N. This condition is intended to reduce the probability of 1-round related-key differentials with non-zero master-key differences; see the argument for condition (B-2) in page 5267.
Finally, the 2nd condition is intended to prevent the derived round-keys from harmful "palindrome-like" properties [72] in the RKA setting. For example, consider a key-schedule (w, γ ) such that w(k) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and it's easy to derive for which γ (k) = (k , 0, 0, k ) and γ (k ⊕ ) = (k , 0, 0, k ) for any master-key k, i.e., ϕ 1 (k⊕)⊕ϕ 4 
Actually, it might be possible to prove security without the 2nd condition. But this requires γ 2 and γ 3 to fulfill more involved conditions. Therefore, our Definition 1, with no requirement on γ 2 and γ 3 at the expense of slightly more requirements on ϕ 1 and ϕ 4 , captures a "minimal" group of conditions to some extent.
B. Security for 4 Rounds With Good Key-Schedules and f=P
Instantiated with a good key-schedule, the 4-round KAFw P,(w,γ ) is secure against ⊕-RKAs.
Proof . We first introduce some notations that will ease the subsequent analysis.
For any tuple t = (, L R, ST ) in Q E and any function f ( f = P or F; the former is the focus of this subsection), we define 10 functions
The suffix f emphasizes that the functions depend on f . Note that these values are derived in an "L R → X, Y ← ST " manner, rather than the "L R → X → Y → ST " manner. Moreover, x 1 (t) and x 4 (t) only depend on τ .
To ease understanding our proofs, below we serve an overview of our strategy.
1) Proof Strategy:
Following Lemma 1, with respect to a fixed (q f , q e )-distinguisher D, below in section III-B2 we define bad transcripts, and upper bound their probability of occurring in the ideal world. This probability is computed over the random choice of the key, and thus we could leverage the properties of good key-schedules.
Later in section III-B3, we lower bound Pr re (τ ) (and thus the ratio Pr re (τ )/Pr id (τ )) for any good τ . In this step we follow [62] and define a "bad" predicate B(P) on P, such that collisions in the 2q e inputs in the 2nd and 3rd rounds
and collisions in the 2q e corresponding outputs
are classified as conditions of B(P). These values are determined by P and thus random. Consequently, Pr[B(P)] could be upper bounded. In addition, as long as B(P) is not fulfilled, it is easy to transform the probability Pr re (τ ) into the (easyto-bound) probability that
i.e., P is consistent with the inputs/outputs of the middle two rounds. These cinch the final bound.
2) Bad Transcripts: defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Bad Transcripts for 4-Round KAFw
is bad, if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
. Otherwise we say τ is good. Denote by T bad the set of bad transcripts.
We analyze the conditions in turn, with (B-1) the first. For any t = (, L R, ST ) in Q E and any x, as
As we have at most q e 2 ≤
Summing over the q 2 e choices of (t, t ) yields For (B-4) , consider a pair (t, t ). Wlog assume that t comes after t. If t was forward RK[IC k ](, L R ) → S T , then the obtained S T is uniform in a set of size at least N 2 − q e , and since q e ≤ N we have
Similarly, Pr
Therefore, for each of the q e 2 ≤ 
When t was backward, L R is uniform, and similar bounds hold. Taking a union bound for the q e queries gives Pr[(B-5)] ≤ 4q e N . Summing over the above yields
3) Ratio Pr re (τ )/Pr id (τ ) for Good τ : Fix a good transcript τ . As per our remark before, we define the bad predicate B(P) in paragraph III-B3.a. Then, it's easy to see (11) where p = Pr P RK[KAFw
We next argue
in paragraphs III-B3.b and III-B3.c. Gathering this and Eq. (11) yields
which allows us to conclude in paragraph III-B3.d.
a) The Bad Predicate B(P): For any P Q P , the predicate B(P) holds, if any of the following is fulfilled:
, y 4 (t , P) . Remark. As per our discussion before, collisions in the 2q e values in Eq. (8) and in the 2q e values in Eq. (9) are captured by (C-1) and (C-3) resp. Moreover, there should be no "conflict" between these 4q e values and the inputs/outputs in 1st and 4th rounds, as captured by (C-2) and (C-4). This is crucial, as the values of the forms P(x 1 (t)) and P(x 4 (t)) will be used for bounding Pr[B(P)], and it's unclear how this affects their distribution. Finally, note that x 2 (t, P) and y 3 (t, P) depends on the same random value P(x 1 (t)) (and could be analyzed at the same time), while x 3 (t, P) and y 2 (t, P) depends on P(x 4 (t)): this clarifies the order of the above bad conditions.
We now analyze Pr[B(P)]. Let t = (, L R, ST ). Consider (C-1) first. For each pair (t, t ), the event x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) implies
Define a set of function values S = P(
. Thus conditioned on P Q P and further the function values in S, P(x 1 (t)) is uniform in a set of size at least N − q f − 2q e . This means the left hand side of Eq. (14) is random conditioned on the right hand side, thus Pr[ N−q f −2q e . We next consider (C-2). As argued, for any t, X (t, P) is uniform in ≥ N − q f − 2q e possibilities. On the other hand, all the values in X (τ ) are fixed by τ and thus independent from the function values of P. Therefore,
Similarly,
Now consider Pr[∃t : y 3 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P)]. If this event happens, then
.
is random conditioned on the left hand side. Therefore,
Finally consider Pr[∃t : y 3 (t, P) = y 1 (t , P)]. If this event happens, then for t there exists t ∈ Q E such that
We distinguish two cases:
Then for this tuple t we have L ⊕ w 0 (k ) = w 2 (k ) ⊕ S, which contradicts ¬(B-5) (Definition 2). As we have q e choices for t we obtain
Summing over (15) , (16) , (17), (18) , and (20) , and taking union bound on the q e choices of t, we obtain
The analysis for (C-4) is similar by symmetry: for each t = (, L R, ST ) ∈ Q E , P(x 4 (t)) and further Y (t, P) = T ⊕ w 3 (k ) ⊕ P(x 4 (t)), x 3 (t, P), and y 2 (t, P) are uniform. By this, for t,
Now consider Pr[∃t : x 3 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P)]. If it happens, then for t there exists t = ( , L R , S T ) such that
By ¬(B-3) we have x 4 (t) = x 1 (t ), so the right hand side of (24) is random conditioned on P(x 4 (t)). 
By similar arguments, it can be shown Pr[∃t : y 2 (t, P) = y 1 (t ) or y 2 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P)]
Finally consider Pr[∃t : y 2 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P)]. For t if it happens then there exists t = ( , L R , S T ) such that
If x 4 (t) = x 4 (t ) then the right hand side of (27) is random conditioned on P(x 4 (t)) and thus Pr[Eq.
Summing over (22), (23), (25) , (26) , and (28), and taking union over q e yield
Finally, summing over the four conditions yields
b) The Probability p: For any P * Q P such that B(P * ) doesn't hold, we define an "extended transcript"
We further define T out as the set of all such extended transcripts, i.e.,
T out = Q out (P) P∈P(n) , and a set of "good" extended transcripts based on permutations that don't fulfill the bad predicate, i.e.,
T out good = Q out (P * ) P * Q P ,¬B( P * ) . Next, for any instance Q out ∈ T out , we define another extended transcript Q mid (Q out ). Formally, let P * be a permutation such that Q out (P * ) = Q out , then
It's easy to see that such a choice of P * may not be unique, but for all P * with Q out (P * ) = Q out , the transcripts Q mid (Q out ) defined as above are the same since the condition Q out (P * ) = Q out ensures that P * is consistent with the input-output relations defined in Q out which will fully characterize Q mid (Q out ). With these, by the definitions of KAFw we have p =
For any Q out ∈ T out good , the conditions ¬(C-2) and ¬(C-4) ensure that
In the next paragraph, we show |Q mid (Q out )| = 2q e to complete the proof of Eq. (12) and further (13) .
c) 2q e Relations for Good P: By the definitions, for any Q out ∈ T out good , there exists P Q P such that B(P) doesn't hold, and Q out (P) = Q out . Now we can write
We show {x 2 (t, P), x 3 (t, P) t ∈ Q E } = 2q e and {y 2 (t, P), y 3 (t, P) t ∈ Q E } = 2q e . First, by ¬B(P) (i.e., ¬(C-4)), for any pair (t, t ), it holds x 2 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) and y 2 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P). It remains to show • x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P), y 2 (t, P) = y 2 (t , P), and • x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P), y 3 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P).
Consider (x 2 (t, P), x 2 (t , P)) and (y 3 (t, P), y 3 (t , P)) first: their proof flows are similar. In detail, let t = (, L R, ST ) and t = ( , L R , S T ), then we exclude possibility of x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) or y 3 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P) for each case:
(i) Case 1: = . Then x 1 (t, P) = x 1 (t , P) by ¬(B-2) (see Definition 2), and further x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) and y 3 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P) by ¬(C-1); (ii) Case 2: = , yet R = R . Then still x 1 (t, P) = x 1 (t , P), thus further x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) and y 3 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P); (iii) Case 3: = and R = R . Then it has to be L = L since t = t . Now:
By the above, it does hold x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) and y 3 (t, P) = y 3 (t , P) for any t = t . A symmetrical argument could establish x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) and y 2 (t, P) = y 2 (t , P) for any t = t .
d) The Final Counting: By the above discussion and (13) and (29) , when q f + 2q e ≤ N/2, for any τ ∈ T good we have
Gathering this, (10), and Lemma 1 yields Theorem 1.
C. When f=F Is a Random Function
With a good key-schedule specified in Definition 1, the ⊕-RKA security claim still holds when we use a random function F for f . For the proof, we make some moderate modifications to the previous proof for KAFw P, (w,γ ) . First, (of course) the helper functions y 1 (t, P), X (t, P), . . . here are defined on F instead of P, i.e. y 1 (t, F), X (t, F), . . .
Then, note that since F is a random function, for the to-bederived 2q e equalities
collisions within the image set {y 2 (t, F), y 3 (t, F) t ∈ Q E } would not be troublesome. Therefore, the main task is to drop definitions and arguments concerning these image values.
In detail, we recall that in the definition of bad transcripts (Definition 2),
• the condition (B-4) is only used for proving Pr
We then modify the definition of B(P) into B(F). We remark that for any value x such that F(x) remains unknown, the function value F(x) is uniform in {0, 1} n , which slightly deviates from the permutation case. Then, following the idea as before, we make the following modifications:
(i) Dropping y 3 (t, F) = y 3 (t , F) in (C-1). This decreases Pr[(C-1)] to q 2 e 2N (with the above remark in mind); (ii) Dropping the condition(s) ∃t, t :
. This decreases Pr[(C-2)] to q e (q f +2q e ) N ; (iii) Dropping y 2 (t, F) = y 2 (t , F) in (C-3). This decreases Pr[(C-3)] to q 2 e 2N ; (iv) Dropping the condition(s) ∃t, t :
In total we have
Finally,
Therefore,
Gathering (30) and (31) 
IV. KAFw WITH AFFINE KEY-SCHEDULES
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of KAFw with affine key-schedules. First, in section IV-A, we describe attacks against 4-and 5-round KAFw. These attacks can be easily adapted to KAF (of more general interest for attacks). Then, we prove security for 6-round KAFw P, (w,γ ) and KAFw F, (w,γ ) in sections IV-B and IV-C respectively.
A. Insecurity for 4 and 5 Rounds
We stress that, for attacks we consider KAFw built upon any round-functions, and thus notations used in this subsection have slightly different meanings than those from section II. In detail, let (w, γ ) be a t-round key-schedule, and − → f = ( f 1 , . . . , f t ) be any t functions. Then we define a t-round KAFw variant
where wk in = w 0 (k)w 1 (k) and wk out = w 2 (k)w 3 (k). And for any distinguisher D, we define
With these notations, subsubsections IV-A1 and IV-A2 below present negative results on 4 and 5 rounds respectively.
1) Insecurity for 4 Rounds With Any Affine Key-Schedules:
From a cryptanalytic point of view, note that for KAFw with affine key-schedules, we have 2-round related-key differential characteristics with probability 1: see Eq. (32) and (33) , γ ) where w and γ are as defined in Eq. (5) and (6) , it holds
Proof: We denote generically (RK[E k ], − → f ) the oracles to which the adversary has access, where E is either KAFw − → f , (w,γ ) or IC. The distinguisher D proceeds as:
(1) choose arbitrary values L, R, ∈ {0, 1} n , = 0, let (w,γ ) , and otherwise 0: E is IC.
We show the output is always 1 when E is KAFw − → f ,(w,γ ) . It's not hard to see for any i and any V, ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds
This is essentially a 1-round related-key differential with probability 1. To ease exposition, we follow the notation in [23] and denote this phenomena by
Concatenating two such differentials gives rise to two 2-round related-key differentials with probability 1 as follows
Pr
where wk in = w 0 (k)w 1 (k), wk out = w 2 (k)w 3 (k), and XOR wk (W ) = wk ⊕ W . Therefore, for the two forward queries, if we assume
then by (32) it holds 35) for wk in = w 0 (k )w 1 (k ). Eq. (34) and (35) also mean
where wk out = w 2 (k )w 3 (k ), and S, T, S , T are the values appeared during the attack. Consider the two backward queries, and assume that
By (33) we have
On the other hand, when interacting with
which is also the probability that the distinguisher outputs 1 in the ideal world. Thus the claimed bound.
2) (In)security for 5 Rounds: We first exhibit an attack with only one additional assumption on the key-schedule: it's easy to derive = 0 such that M 1 · = M 5 · . This is possible: e.g., if γ 1 and γ 5 are bit-permutations, then for = 0xFF . . . FF it holds M 1 · = M 5 · = 0xFF . . . FF. From a cryptanalytic point of view, the core trick is: in the boomerang attack setting, under some conditions, Feistel schemes allow a Feistel boomerang switch trick [24] , which enables penetrating one more round. Applying this trick to the 4-round related-key boomerang mentioned before yields a 5-round related-key boomerang distinguisher. Formally, Theorem 4 There exists a (0, 4)-distinguisher D such that, for any 5 functions − → f = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 , f 5 ) and any 5-round affine key-schedule (w, γ ) where w and γ are as defined in Eq. (5) and (6) and satisfy that it's easy to derive = 0 such that M 1 · = M 5 · , it holds
Proof: The distinguisher D proceeds as: (1) derive a difference = 0 such that M 1 · = M 5 · ;
(2) choose two arbitrary values L, R ∈ {0, 1} n , and let (w,γ ) , and otherwise 0: E is IC.
We show the output is always 1 when E is KAFw − → f , (w,γ ) . Assume that wk in = w 0 (k)w 1 (k), and
for k = k ⊕ and wk in = w 0 (k )w 1 (k ). Computing one more round, we obtain
The differential Eq. (33) should be adapted to 5 rounds:
where wk out = w 2 (k)w 3 (k). By this and Eq. (36) and (37), if we assume wk
Now since M 5 · = M 1 · , it can be seen
. We've proved that the probability of outputting 1 in the ideal world is 1/(N 2 − 1) in the proof of Theorem 3. Thus the claim.
Note that we did not assume ∃ = 0 such that M 1 · = M 3 · or M 3 · = M 5 · . In this case, the scheme suffers from simpler complementation-based attacks, see Appendix B.
On the other hand, if there is no = 0 such that M 1 · = M 5 · , then the above attack is not effective. In fact, we conjecture security in this (latter) case, but the proof would be a significantly different from those in this paper. Moreover, it's inferior in the sense that it requires additional assumptions on the key-schedule (i.e. ∀ = 0, M 1 · = M 5 · ). We thereby leave it for future, and revert to 6 rounds.
B. Security for 6 Rounds When f=P
We first present the conditions on the key-schedule (w, γ ) that are sufficient for security proof for 6-round KAFw f, (w,γ ) .
Definition 3 (Good Affine Key-Schedule for 6 Rounds)
We say that a 6-round key-schedule (w, γ ), for which w = (w 0 , w 1 
is good, if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ϕ 1 , ϕ 6 , and ϕ 1 ⊕ ϕ 6 are bijective maps of {0, 1} n , where
The 1st condition resembles those in Definition 1. On the other hand, the 2nd condition prevents the complementing attacks. One could see Appendix B for further insights.
Theorem 5 When q f + 4q e ≤ N/2, for the 6-round, random permutation-based KAFw P,(w,γ ) cipher with a good key-schedule (w, γ ) as specified in Definition 3, it holds
14q e q f + 57q 2 e + 4q e N .
Proof. The proof strategy is similar to that described in section III-B1. For any function transcript Q f = ((x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x q f , y q f )), we define X (τ ) and Y(τ ) as the sets {x 1 , . . . , x q f } and {y 1 , . . . , y q f }. We also define 16 functions for any tuple t = (, L R, ST ) in Q E and any function f ( f = P ∈ P(n) in this subsection):
Bad Transcripts are then defined as follows. P,(w,γ ) ) An attainable transcript τ = (Q E , Q P , k) is bad, if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled: 2 ) · ( ⊕ ). Otherwise we say τ is good. Denote by T bad the set of bad transcripts.
Definition 4 (Bad Transcripts for 6-Round KAFw
Recall that
Since both ϕ 1 and ϕ 6 are bijective maps of F n 2 , Pr[(B-1)] ≤ 2q e q f N is obvious. On the other hand, since ϕ 1 ⊕ ϕ 6 is also bijective, for each choice of t = (, L R, ST ) and t = ( , L R , S T ) it holds
Therefore, Pr[(B-2)] ≤ 
Ratio Pr re (τ )/Pr id (τ ) for Good τ . We define two bad predicates on P in turn. Then, using an argument similar to subsection III-B3, we show that if neither of the two predicates holds, then Pr[KAFw P,(w,γ ) k Q E ] ≥ 1 N 2qe . These cinch the bounds.
First Bad Predicate. For any P Q P , the predicate B1(P) holds, if any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
. For (C-11), for each pair (t, t ) with t = (, L R, ST ) and t = ( , L R , S T ), the event x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) is equivalent to X (t, P) ⊕ X (t , P) = M 2 · ( ⊕ ), which is further equivalent to
Since τ is good, it holds x 1 (t) / ∈ X (τ ). Conditioned on P Q P and the ≤ 2q e function values P(x i (t )) | t ∈ Q E , i = 1, 6, x i (t ) = x 1 (t) (which includes P(x 1 (t )) since x 1 (t) = x 1 (t )), P(x 1 (t)) is uniform in at least N − q f − 2q e possibilities. Therefore, for each pair (t, t ),
Then, the value x 2 (t, P) relies on P(x 1 (t)), and is thus uniform. Since the values in X (τ ) and the values of the form x 1 (t ) and x 6 (t ) are all independent from P(x 1 (t)), it holds
For (C-13) the analysis is similar to (C-11) by symmetry, yielding the same bound
Similarly, the main claim in (C-14) can be bounded:
The remaining subevent of (C-14), i.e. ∃t, t : x 5 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P), is equivalent to
By ¬(B-2), x 1 (t ) = x 6 (t), thus P(x 1 (t ))-as well as the entire right hand side-is random conditioned on P(x 6 (t)). 
Finally, since both P(x 1 (t)) and P(x 6 (t)) are uniform for each t, we immediately obtain Pr[(C-15)] ≤ 2q e N−q f −2q e . Summing over Pr[(C-11)] to Pr[(C-15)], we reach
Second Bad Predicate. We then consider a random permutation P such that P Q P and ¬B1(P). For this P, the predicate B2(P) holds if any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
), yet either x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) or y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P);
x 2 (t , P), x 5 (t , P), x 6 (t ) , or -y 4 (t, P) ∈ y 1 (t , P), y 2 (t , P), y 5 (t , P), y 6 (t , P) . 3 (t , P), x 5 (t , P), x 6 (t ) , or -y 3 (t, P) ∈ y 1 (t , P), y 2 (t , P), y 4 (t , P), y 5 (t , P), y 6 (t , P) . First, for each t = (, L R, ST ), conditioned on P Q P and the ≤ 4q e values {P(x i (t )), P(x j (t , P)), t ∈ Q E , i = 1, 6, j = 2, 5,
the value y 2 (t, P) = P(x 2 (t, P)) remains uniform in at least N − q f − 4q e possibilities. So Y (t, P), x 3 (t, P), and y 4 (t, P) derived from y 2 (t, P) are all uniform. These show:
Second, for cleanness let k = k ⊕ and k = k ⊕ , then
By ¬(C-12), x 2 (t, P) = x 1 (t ), x 2 (t, P) = x 6 (t ), x 2 (t, P) = x 6 (t), so for the involved equality the right hand side is random conditioned on the left hand side. Therefore,
For similar reasons,
Pr ∃t, t : y 4 (t, P) = y 1 (t , P) = Pr ∃t, t :
Pr ∃t, t : y 4 (t, P) = y 6 (t , P) = Pr ∃t, t : P(x 2 (t, P)) = R ⊕ w 1 (k ) ⊕ T ⊕ w 3 (k ) ⊕ P(x 6 (t)) ⊕ P(x 6 (t ))
Furthermore, by ¬(C-14), ∀t, t , x 2 (t, P) = x 5 (t , P). So Pr[∃t, t : y 4 (t, P) = y 5 (t , P)] = Pr[∃t, t : R ⊕ w 1 (k ) ⊕ P(x 2 (t, P)) ⊕ T ⊕ w 3 (k ) ⊕ P(x 6 (t)) = P(x 5 (t , P))]
Finally, for a pair (t, t ), y 4 (t, P) = y 2 (t , P) would imply
Then, (1) If x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P), then for t = (, L R, ST ) it holds
contradicting ¬(C-15); (2) Otherwise, P(x 2 (t , P)) is random conditioned on the left hand side of (51), thus Pr[Eq.
Summing over (43)- (52), we obtain
Third, symmetrically, for each t = (, L R, ST ) ∈ Q E , the value y 5 (t, P) = P(x 5 (t, P)) remains random. So Z (t, P), x 4 (t, P), and y 3 (t, P) are all uniform. Therefore, Pr[(C-23)] ≤ q 2 e N−q f −4q e . In addition, in a similar vein to the analysis of (C-22), we have • Pr[∃t :
Pr[∃t, t :
⊕ P(x 5 (t, P)) = P(x 1 (t ))] = Pr P(x 5 (t, P)) = L ⊕ w 0 (k ) ⊕ S ⊕ w 2 (k ) C O N 3 , will be used later
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t , x 5 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P). So
Pr[∃t, t : y 3 (t, P) = y 2 (t , P)] = Pr[P(x 5 (t, P) 
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t , x 5 (t, P) = x 6 (t ). So
Pr[∃t, t : y 3 (t, P) = y 6 (t , P)]
By ¬(C-14), ∀t, t , x 5 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) and x 5 (t, P) = x 6 (t ). So
Finally consider Pr[∃t, t : y 3 (t, P) = y 5 (t , P)]. If it happens then we have
If x 5 (t, P) = x 5 (t , P) then the right hand side of (53) is random given P(x 5 (t, P)) and Pr[Eq.
In all, we have 
Define B(P) = B1(P) ∨ B2(P). Then Eq. (42) and (55) yield
2q e Equations. Similarly to the 4-round case, we show
Here ¬B(P) indicates
By an analysis similar to subsection III-B3, we only need to show
for i = 3, 4. For this, we argue t = t ⇒ x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) and y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P) for any t = (, L R, ST ) and t = ( , L R , S T ):
. By the definition of ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , γ 1 , and γ 2 , the former implies x 1 (t ) ; and the latter further implies
i.e. x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P). And it necessarily be = , otherwise ⊕ = 0 and thus R = R and L = L and t = t , a contradiction. Then:
Then we have
thus M 3 ·(⊕ ) = M 1 ·(⊕ ), contradicting condition (2) in Definition 3 (good key-schedule for 6 rounds); • y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P). Because the assumption on
. By ¬(C-13) we further have A(t, P) ⊕ A(t , P) = M 1 · ( ⊕ ). However, in this case, it necessarily be
Therefore, we must have Y (t, P) ⊕ Y (t , P) = A(t, P) ⊕ A(t , P), i.e. y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P); Case 2: for (t, t ), x 1 (t) = x 1 (t ), yet x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P). Then by ¬(C-21) we immediately have x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) and y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P); Case 3: for (t, t ), x 1 (t) = x 1 (t ). This implies x 2 (t, P) = x 2 (t , P) by ¬(C-11), and further x 3 (t, P) = x 3 (t , P) and y 4 (t, P) = y 4 (t , P) by ¬(C-21).
So x 3 (t, P) t ∈ Q E = y 4 (t, P) t ∈ Q E = q e . The argument for x 4 (t, P) and y 3 (t, P) is similar by symmetry (utilizing the property M 4 · = M 6 · for = 0 given in Definition 3 and the condition ¬(C-13)). By all the above discussion and (56), for any good τ , when q f + 4q e ≤ N/2, via a counting similar to that in the previous section we reach
Gathering this and (39) and Lemma 1 yields Theorem 5.
C. When f=F Is a Random Function
For the proof, we need the following modifications on the proof for 6-round KAFw P,(w,γ ) :
(1) in Definition 4 (bad transcripts), (B-3) is only used for proving ∀(t, t ) : y 3 (t, F) = y 3 (t , F), y 4 (t, F) = y 4 (t , F), cf. page 5276. We thus drop it and obtain
(2) in the definition of B1(F), the two conditions X (t, F)⊕ X (t , F) = M 6 · ( ⊕ ) in (C-11) and A(t, F) ⊕ A(t , F) = M 1 · ( ⊕ ) in (C-13) are only used for proving ∀(t, t ) : y 3 (t, F) = y 3 (t , F), y 4 (t, F) = y 4 (t , F), cf. page 5276. In addition, (C-15) is only used for proving ∀(t, t ) : y 2 (t, F) = y 4 (t , F), y 3 (t, F) = y 5 (t , F), cf. page 5275. We thus drop them, which decreases Pr[B1(F)] to 2q e q f +6q 2 e N ; (3) in the definition of B2(F), we drop • y 4 (t, F) = y 4 (t , F) in (C-21), and • ∃t, t : y 4 (t, F) ∈ Y(τ ) or y 4 (t, F) ∈ {y 1 (t , F), y 2 (t , F), y 5 (t , F), y 6 (t , F)} in (C-22), and • y 3 (t, F) = y 3 (t , F) in (C-23), and • ∃t, t : y 3 (t, F) ∈ Y(τ ) or y 3 (t, F) ∈ {y 1 (t , F), y 2 (t , F), y 4 (t , F), y 5 (t , F), y 6 (t , F)} in (C-24).
These decrease Pr[B2(F)] to 2q e q f +10q 2 e N . Therefore,
Gathering (57) and (58) gives rise to the following Theorem. 
Concretely, the 4-round KAFv f,γ * schedule (γ * 0 , . . . , γ * 5 ) corresponds to the 4-round KAFw f,(w,γ ) schedule (w, γ ) with w 0 (k) = w 1 (k) = 0, γ 1 = γ * 0 (thus ϕ 1 = w 1 ⊕ γ 1 = γ * 0 ), and ϕ 4 = γ 4 ⊕ w 2 = γ * 5 . The first half of the corollary thus follows from Definition 1.
The 6-round affine key-schedule γ * = (γ * 0 , . . . , γ * 7 ) corresponds to the 6-round affine schedule (w, γ ), in which ϕ 1 = w 1 ⊕ γ 1 = γ * 0 , ϕ 6 = γ 6 ⊕ w 2 = γ * 7 , and: (1) γ 1 ⊕ γ 3 = γ * 2 , and thus M * 2 = M 1 ⊕ M 3 ; (2) γ 4 ⊕ γ 6 = γ * 5 , and thus M * 5 = M 4 ⊕ M 6 . Therefore, the second half follows from Definition 3.
We believe the requirements on schedules of KAFv f,γ * are more relaxed than those required by KAF f,γ (Corollary 1), since its condition (2) only requires to carefully design γ 2 and γ 5 , without considering the more complicated interactions between different round-KDFs (comparing with the second condition in Definition 3). In particular, when designing affine key-schedules in practice, one tends to choose invertible matrices for M 0 , . . . , M t +1 in order to ensure the largest possible amount of entropy in the round-keys, e.g. the bit-permutationbased key-schedules in DES. In this case, condition (2) is naturally satisfied, yet the second condition in Definition 3 may not be satisfied! (And when M 1 · k and M 3 · k define two bit-permutations, the latter condition is indeed violated since M 1 · = M 3 · = for = 0xFF . . . FF. This matches that DES is vulnerable to complementing attacks.)
Finally, we remark that whitening keys play a crucial role in the transformation Eq. (60). This means KAFv-as well as the Lucifer-like model-cannot be precisely captured by KAF, the variant of KAFw without whitening keys.
VI. TOWARDS MINIMALISM
To maximize the efficiency of the resulted permutation modes, we derive theoretically "minimal" constructions. We focus on KAF P,γ as it's of the most general interest, and it's wlog, since minimal KAFw P,(w,γ ) and KAFv P,γ * schemes can be easily derived similarly.
First, for the 4-round KAF P,γ , γ 1 (k) = M 1 ⊗ k ⊕ k 3 , γ 2 (k) = γ 3 (k) = 0, and γ 4 (k) = M 4 ⊗ k ⊕ k 3 is a group of good choices, where M 1 = M 4 are two non-zero constants in {0, 1} n , and ⊗ denotes multiplications taken over the finite field F 2 n . With this choice, it can be seen the three parameters mentioned in Definition 1 are such that δ 1 ≤ 3/N, δ 2 ≤ 2/N, and δ 3 ≤ 2/N, and the concrete advantage bound is a classical birthday one 14q e q f +31q 2 e +4q e N . Our choice of γ 1 and γ 4 is motivated by [77] . On the other hand, since no requirement is placed on γ 2 and γ 3 (see Corollary 1 or Definition 1), they are completely absent: this matches the existing result that the two middle round-functions of 4-round Feistel do not need to be secret/"protected" by round-keys [78] . This KAF P,γ variant seems "minimal" in the sense that removing any component harms security: reducing rounds ruins CCA security, choosing M 1 = M 4 introduces the weakness KAF Second, for 6-round KAF P,γ , using a linear orthomorphism π, the key-schedule k → (k, 0, 0, 0, 0, π(k)) is sufficient. It may be quite hard to believe many carefully designed sophisticated key-schedules (e.g. DES) are insufficient to prevent complementing attacks, while such an exotic design should be good. The reason is that the absence of the 3rd and 4th round-keys incidently prevents the complementation properties.
We stress that the key-schedule instances with many "blanks" mentioned here are for theoretically minimalism rather than for general purpose Feistel ciphers. For the latter purpose, one could (actually, should) "fill in the blanks". For example, using π(k L k R ) = k R k L ⊕ k R mentioned in the Introduction, it can be seen k → (k, k, π(k), k, k, π(k)) is a good key-schedule for 6-round KAF P,γ .
1) A Tweakable KAC: Finally, in 4-round KAFw f,(w,γ ) , we can set w 1 (k) = M 1 ⊗ k ⊕ k 3 and w 2 (k) = M 4 ⊗ k ⊕ k 3 , while omit all the other sub-keys. This results in a variant of the 1-round tweakable KAC of [21] , with the permutation instantiated by a 4-round keyless Feistel network.
VII. CONCLUSION
We've studied provable security of key-alternating Feistel/Feistel-2 variants against ⊕-induced related-key attacks, which better model the reality of Feistel blockciphers.
Assuming key-schedules being non-linear or purely affine, we identify (different) conditions on the key-schedules that are sufficient for a birthday-type security up to 2 n/2 queries. The results and implications make a step towards understanding the behaviors of existing different Feistel cipher structures, and offer new insights.
where ∇ 1 = (M (w) 0 ⊕ M 2 )·, ∇ 2 = (M (w) 1 ⊕ M 1 )·, wk out = w 2 (k)w 3 (k), the output difference δ = 2 ⊕ M (w)
· when t is even, and δ = 1 ⊕ M (w) 3 · 2 ⊕ M (w) 2 · otherwise. This allows distinguishing any t rounds with 2 queries. To save space we omit detailed descriptions of these two (innovel) variants of complementing attacks.
